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Ixsunancn Cor,tsuuER CoUNSEL's Corunnx
THn CoNsrrruuoNAl ArracK ON Mo¡,rrANa's A¡ûr-StecKrNG Srarurn
By

Without doubt, the most signihcant and ftusttating obsttuction to
securing adequate insurance compensation for consumets dght now is the
stâtutory prohibition against "stack-

ing" of auto insurance coverages.
Legislative amendments to MCA
Section 33-23-203 in 1.997 weie intended to absolutely block any stacking of insurance benefits in motot
vehicle liability policies. Because the
amendments so sevetely cut potential
limits of recovery for auto accident
victims, plaintrffs' counsel have been
ptessing arguments in state district
couïts seeking to avoid the anti-stacking statute's effect or to attack the
statute itself. In at least two instances,
stacking cases were settled after decision by district judges and before
appeal.

In the Summer 1999 issue of
Trial Trend¡,I wrote an article entitled, ""Stacking" in Montana in
1999,'that traced the histoty of the
stacking issue in Montana and discussed the legal import of the 1.997
amendments. In the Spring 2002
issue,

in a column entitled, 'The

Case Against Monta¡na's ArrtiStacking Statute,'I collected and

featuted a numbet of argrments that
wete being ptessed ¿tound the state
in favor of stacking and challenging
the anti-stacking statute.
Fortuitously, the stackirig issue
has now arrived at the Montana Supreme Courtin the case of llørdy u.
hogtes siu e Sp e cíahy lttsurørce
Comp øny. MTI-A member I(ent
Ducku/orth of Ronan represents Ned
Hardy who suffered a broken neck in
auto accident on December 26,2000.
Hardy was a passenger in a car driven
by his wife, which was stuck by a

vehicle negligently driven by Gary
Marc. Hardy settled with Mart's liabil-
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ity cartier for irs $50,000 liability limit

2) Given that the Montana

and then ptessed claims against his
own insutet, Ptogressive, for the

preme Court has determined
that underinsutance coverâge
is personal and portable, is it
against public policy in Montanâ to charge separate premiums for underinsurance for
sepârâte vehicles on the same
policy if insureds can only
collect once on that policy?
3) Are insurance policies such as
the one in question here
against public policy in Montana when they include provisions that defeat coverage for
which the insurer has received
valuable consideration?

$50,000 limits of Undednsured Motorist covetage on each of his three
vehicles under the policy and fot the
separâte Medical Pay coverage limits
on each. Hardy had paid sepârâte
premiums for each vehicle and for
each coverage.
Ptogressive refused to stack the
coverages fot the three vehicles and
also asserted that no UIM coverage
was available based on its restrictive
definition of an "underinsured motorist" and on an offset provision

tha! together with the definition,
entirely defeated Hardy's UIM covetage. Progressive assetted that antd-

stacking ptovisions of Progressive's
policy and the Montana anti-stacking
staflrte, MCA Section 33-23-203,
prohibited the stacking of the coverages. With regard to the UIM coverage, Progressive's policy testtictively
requires that an "undetinsured motorist' have limits of liability less
than the lirnits of the insured's UIM
coverage (as opposed to less than the

of the UIM insuted's damages).
Finally, the policy ptovided that any
liabiJity limits recovered be subftacted
limits

from any UIM covetage available
it cettain that the
insured could nevet recover the limits
of UIM shown on the declarations
thereby making

page.
sive

I(ent Duckwotth sued Progresin the Federal District Coutt in

Missoula and secuted Judge Molloy's
cettification of the following three
questions to the Montana Supreme
Court:
1) Is the offset provision in
Ptogtessive's policy void in
Montana as against public

policy?

Su-

I(ent Duckworth invited MTLA
to join in the effott and, because of
the importance of the questions
involved, the MTI-A Amicus Committee successfully petitioned the
court to enter the case. I(ent wrote a
fine bdef atgurng the fallacy in allov¡ing a statute controlling stacking of
motor vehicle coverages to apply to
petsonal and portable coverages like
UIM and Med Pay. He also attacked
the '.illusory" coverage caused by the
UIM definition and offset provisions.
MTI-A member Randy Bishop
and I endeavoted to add arguments
different from I(ent's in the amicus
brief. Hence, Randy reseatched and
wrote the âÍgument on stacking that
challenges the validity of the antistacking stahrte undet four provisions
of the Montana Constitution, and I
wrote the ârguments on the UIM
definition and offset arguments. 'V7e
edited each other's wotk and honed
the arguments until we convinced
ourselves of their impeccable logic
and righteousness. Because of the
importance of Randy's constitutional
stacking ârguments, they are teprinted
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hete in full. In next quarter's column,
I will discuss the issue of the validity
of Ptogressive's restrictive definition

of UIM

and its offset, which result in
"illusory" covefage. Here then are the
arguments submitted by amicus

MTI-A challengrng the constitutionality of the anti=stacking statute:

htroúrction
Section 33-23-203 MCA violates
separation of powers, denies equal
protection, and arbitnftly inftinges
upon inalienable dghts.
For 30 years, this court has consistentþ articulated Mont¿na's public
policy prohibiting insurers ftom placing provisions in insurance policies
that defeat coverâge for which the
insuret has received valuable consideraton. Rttckdaschelu. Støte Fønn
Muhøl AutotnobíIe Insuranûe Cn

Mont. 395, 398, 948 P.zd
02. In Døkotø Fìre fnsur-

(1,997), 285
7

00,7

ønce Comp ø.ny a. Oìe,

1998

N(Í

288, 'lï1134 & 35;291Mont. 486,499500, 968 P.2d 11261134-35, this

between three decade's judicial exptession of pubJic policy v¿hich re-

court labored to give effect to the
1991 version of Section 33-23-203.
was able to do so because crucial
omissions were found within the

quires stacking, and Section

It

33-23-203 (1,997), which forbids it.

Amicus curiae MTI-A submits
that the reason this court has so con-

statutory language. Foreshadowing
the issue here, this court differentiated the 1991 statute from the one

sistently identified and powerfully
endotsed Montana pubJic policy is
that its roots âre deeply imbedded in

now under consideration, observing,
"[u]nlike the 1.997 version of the
statute, the 1991, version applicable
here makes no reference to the number of premiums paid." Id.
Now, this court is directly confronted with legislative action undoubtedly intended, "as a matter of
public policy, to preclude stacking of
uninsured [and underinsured] motorist coverages despite the insured
having paid separate premiums for

multiple, fundamental constitutional

such covetages..." Cf, Oíe,

vþra.The

United States District Court seeks
this court's opinion, upon frst impressionl, of the apparent conflict

guarantees and protections, each

of

which is infringed by Section 33-23203. The office of the Attorney
General has been advised of the
constitutional infrmity of Section
33-23-203 and of the present pro-

Notice of Intent Not to
Participate'is attached as an Appendix tô this brief.
The certified questìons raise, but
ceedings. Its

do not directly refer to, these statutoty and constitutional issues.
Whether the questions certified to
this court are considered broadly as
they have been phrased or reformu-

l
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T

lated as permitted by Rule 44(d),
M.R.App.P., each cetified question
must ultimatel¡ and unequivocally, be
answered "yes." But, implicit within
the cettified questions is a threshold

488,493,662P.2d 591, 594, this
court, cit-ing Legi¡latiue Control Ouer

issue. Namel¡ is the legislature's

view that,
"[u]ny stâtute which mõves so
fat into this realm of judicial

"dictation" of a particulat interpretation of the language of insurance
âgreements an impetmissible invasion
of the power of "detetmination,"
constitutionally reserved to the judiciary? MTLA respectfully submits
that, once again, the unfortunate
answef is "yes."

ludina/ Rule-Makins:

A

Despite this constitut-ional and
statutoty norm, Section 33-23-203
declates that "the limits of insutance

Problen in

coverâge avallable under each part
of the oolicv mu¡Í be determined a¡

Con.çtitutional Reai¡ion (/ 95 8)- 1.07

U.Pa.L.Rev. 1., 31.-32, adopted the

. . " (emphasis added). The
legislature then goes on to dictate the

þlllzt

precise manrìer by which coverage
provisions must be interpreted and
applied. See Section 33-23-203 (a) þ)
and (c) MCr\. In this manner, Section

affasts as to dictate to a judge
how he shall judge ot how he
shall comport himself in judging ot which seeks to sutround
the act of judging with hampering conditions cleatþ of-

-

33-23-203 provides a "cookbook" fot
insurers intent upon preventing
insureds from obtaining the benefit
of their UIM batgain. What is re-

fends the constitutional
scheme of the separation of
powers and v¡ill be held in-

Argument of Amircus Curia MTLA
I. Section33-23-2O3M;CAis
C,onstitutionalþkrvalid

valid."

1. Section 33-23-203 MCAviolates separation of powets.

This court has consistentþ halted
imptopet legislative and executive
incursions into the tealm of judicial

a. Judicial Powet Is Constitutìonally Vested Exclusively In

pov/er. Judicial power cannot be

The Judiciaty.

State ex rel.

taken away by legislative aciton."

The independence of the judiciary is absolute. Montana Constitation,
Article III, Section 1; Aøicle WI, Section
1 (1972). Stated succinctly, "the legis-

lative branch makes the laws, the
executjve branch carries out the laws,
and the judicial btanch construes and
interptets the laws." Med:ín Myers

Reuocable

T?z¿st a.

County, 2002 NIT

Yelkn stone

201.

112'1.,

2002

WL

Bennett u. Bonner
(1950), 123 Mont. 414, 429, 21.4 P.2d
747,755. The manner in which cases
shall be decided is soleþ for the judrcial branch of government. Coøte a,
Omltolt (1983), 203 Mont. 488,492,
662P.2d 591,, 593. See also

City of llelcnø
45, 49,

67

llørlcn

a.

(1984), 208 Mont.

6 P.2d 1.91., 1.93 and

Ingrøb øm u. Cb ømpíon lñemøtí.onøl (L990), 243 Mont. 42, 48-49,
793 P.2d

7

69, 772-73.

.Aøicle

31,01,2788.

The hallmatk of judicial powet is
the power to decide and enter judgments carrying judicial determinations into effect. Seubertu. Seubert,
2000 MT 241,301. Mont. 382, 391,
13 P.3d 365,370-71,. The free exercise of discretion, teasoning, and
judgment, without obedience to the
authodty of the executive or legislative branches of government, is the

charactetistic that differentiates an
independent judiciary from a body
that is merely ministerial. See

Cørlsona. Cíty of Bozema,n,2001
\tl 46, ffi27 -29, 20 P3d 792, 7 97 . rn
Coøte a. Omb olt (1,983), 203 Mont.

Pecn 28

markable is that this enactment commands this coutt, and all Montana
courts, to follow its '"tecþe" to the
letter. Making mâtters still worse, the
legislature demonstrated its willingness to gtant the insutance industry
power to altet the intetptetive mandate, while steadfastly denying it to
the coutts, by authorizing insurers to
"specifi cally provide otherwise."
Section 33 -23 -203 (1) MCA.
Section 33-23-203's directive to
interptet legal insttuments in a ptedetermined manner exceeds the powers
of the legislature and violates our
Constitution's mand¿te that, "No
person or persons charged with the
exetcise of powet propedy belonging
to one branch shall exercise any
po\¡/er ptopedy belonging to either of
the others..." Montana Conúitation,

b. Judicial Powet Is Unconstitu-

III,

Section 1 (/ 972).

MC'\ in-

tionally Abridged By Section 33-

2. Section

23-203.

fringes upon inalienable rights
included within our Declaration

Interpreting insurance contracts
is a question
cowt.

See

of

Døgel

law, reserved
a.

to the

of

33-23-203

Rights, Montana Constitation,

Articl€

II

('1972).

Fartners fnsur-

Ørce Crroup oÍCompønìes (1995),

a. Section 33-23-203 abridges

273 Mont. 402,405,903 P.2d 1.359,
1361. Indeed, it is the legislative
branch that has declared that a court
must decide the construcdon of "statutes and other writings." See Section

fundamental rights to pursue
life's necessities and protect
pfopefty.

26

-'1, -201,,

Sta.te

MC A and Wa.dsoa ort b a,

of M ontønø

(1.99 6), 27 5

Mont. 287, 296,91.1. P2d

1.1.65, 1170.

The individual's right to pursue
life's necessities is a fundamental
right encompassing all activities and
oppoffunities necessâry to the enjoy-
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ment of this dght. Montana Con¡ilration, Article II, Section 3 ft972);
Wadsworth, swpra,275 Mont. at 299,

912,30,\.L.R.4th 165. It is under-

lege and immunity, however, which

written, advettised, and sold to secute
Iife's essentials: to protect earnings

P.2d at 1.172. Thus, the opportunity to pursue employment is a fundamental right because earnings and
earning capacity ". . . ptovide income
for the most basic of life's necessities,
such as food, clothing, and shelter. . .,

and earning capacity, to access medical and insututional care, and to provide food, shelter, clothing, and
retirement in the event of catastrophic injury. As if these truths had
been momentariþ forgotten, the 1997

the 1,997 Legislature granted ittevocably to the insutance industry when
it amended Sectjon 33-23-203 MCA.
Section 33-23-203 ptovides ir:revocable exemption ftom liabiJity for
contractual obligations for which full
value has been demanded, delivered,
and accepted in the form of premi-

91.1.

if not
only
meâns to secuteother
[and] for many,

ums. With these enact-

most, . . . their

!
a- - -t-r legislative
r^ -:-r-¿:. -^ -.-:..:r^-^ ¡^ ^t^^-.
privilege to charge
Special
essentials of modern
mOney fOf a pfOdUCt W¡th the fUll
life, including health
and medical insurance,
knOWledge
J that it need ngt be deliVefed

ments, the legislatute

fundamentalbecause

knewtheindustryhad
no intent-ion to provide.
,\rticle II, Section 31.,

effectivelygranted

;;;r.

í.."se to accept premiums for
personal and portable

retirement,anddaycate.

undetinsuredmotorist
coverage,whichit

_-_rr.. _.._:r^Lr^ L^ Lt^^-Id..Theserightsare is not generally ava¡lable to those
they are of the nâture
that "without which
other constitutionally
guaranteed rights would have little
meaning."

Møtter of C.H. (1.984),210
Mont. L84, 201., 683 P.zd 931,940.
Inextricably linked with the right to
pursue life's necessities, of coufse, is
the in¿lienable right to protect proper\r. Montana Constitwtion, Artic/e II,
Section 3 (/972).
Insurance is the n¡ethod ofprotecting one's property and ability to pursue life's necessities. Modern society
tecognizes that a lifetime's putsuit of
life's necessities can be wiped out in
an instant by the negligence of another and that temedies are meaningless absent the means to obtain
compensation. Undednsured and .
uninsuted mototist insurance is the
sole means of protectìng against the
irresponsible driver who opts to catry
nothing more than minimum automobile liabiJity insurance coverage
limits or none at all. Like life insurance, UIM and UM insurance is personal and portable protection.
kwrctt o. Støte Fønn Mutuøl Aut omob íln I n s ur øltc e Co. (199 3), 261.
Mont. 386, 389, 862 P.2d 1.1.46, 11.48
andJ acob s on a. Implemetú D e ølers Mutua.llnsuranrce Co. (L982),
196 Mont. 542, 548,640 P.2d 908,
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bars such legìslation.

amendments to Section 33-23-203
delegated to the insurance industry
the unbridled power to ptevent
insuteds from enjoying the bene{its
of their personal insurance bargain.

3. The legislatute's abddgement

of these inahenable rights works
a denial of equal protection.
Both the Montana and United

b. Privileges

and immunities.

The legislature is prohibited from
making any trevocable grant of
qpecial privileges, franchises, or immunities. Montønø Confütation, Article
lI, Secrion 31 . A'fuanchise' is in the
nature of a "special privilege confetred by the goveÍnment on an individual which does not belong to the
citDens generally." Glodta. Cíty of
(1 948), 121. Mont. 1.7 8,
183, 190 P.2d 545,548. ,\n immunity
is a special exemption from "duties
which the law genetally requfues othet

Mís soul.ø

citizens to oetfotm." Black's l-^aw
Dictionary lrevised 4th ed. 1968). at o.
885.

Law tequires citizens and cotporations to perfotm theit conttacts.
Special legislative pdvilege to charge
money for a product with the full
knowledge that it need not be delivered is not generally available to
those who do business in Montana. It
is precisely this sott of special privi-

"[n]o
person shall be denied the equal protection of the la'ws." Montana Con¡titation, Article II, Section 4. ''lhe principal
pulpose of the Equal Protection
States constitutions state that,

Clause is to ensute that citizens are

not the subject of arbitrary and discriminate state action." GodJrey u.
Montønø Sta.te Fisb ønd Gøme
Commíssion (1.981), 193 Mont
304,306, 631. P2d 1.265,1.267;
Breuter a. Ski-IiJft, Inc. (1.988),
234 Mont. 1.09, 7 62 P.2d 226. "The
equal protection clause guarantees
that similat individuals will be dealt
with in a similat manner by the government." Butte Communí.ty
Unìon u, Lewis (1986), 219 Mont.
426, 430,

7

1.2

P.zd 1309,

131

1. Equal

protection challenges to legislation are
teviewed under one of three different levels

S.I.M.

of

scrutiny.

(1,997), 287

Møtter of

Mont. 23, 32, 951

P.2d 1,365,1371. Where, as here, the
legislation in question infringes upon

rights identified as fundamental by

Tnrer Tnn¡ros - ArmmN 2OOz

express inclusion in Âtucle

II, this

unable to access the insurance protecuon which they putchased for them-

court employs the most stringent
standard, strict sctutiny. Strict scrutiny
requires the showing of a compelling
state interest undedying the discrimi-

natory action. Wød.sutortb,

and Døoùs u. Uníon Pøcific
Raí.lroød, Co. (1.997), 282 Mont.
233, 24't ,937 P.zd 27, 31.
It would be futile to attempt to

ra;rional basis analysis.

Ç

fets similat severe, totally disabling
injuries while riding as a passenger in
a car owned by another. The only

ance industry con-

a. Støte

Comþensø-

tÍon Insura.nce Fund., 1999 \lff 126,
294 Mont. 448, 458-59 ; 982 P.2d 456,
464 (no rzÍtonal basis for tteating
workers injured over orie wotk shift
differently from workers injuted ovet
two work shifts).
Reasoning identical to that applied by this court tn Døaìs is apro-

Døuís,the
discriminatory impact of the enactment is stunning. Paragraph (1)(a) of
pos, because here, as in

Section 33-23-203 requites this coutt
to "determine" that the limits specified for the coverage available under
the policy insuring the motor vehicle
involved in the accident constitute the
limit of available coverage. If no
such policy exists, howeveï, p^ràgraph (1)þ) of Section 33-23-203
mandates that the courts "determirie"
that the "highest limits of coverage"
constitute the "insurance coverâges
avallable." Thus, based solely upon
whether the 'lehicle involved in the
accident" had coverage, an injured
person or famrly may be stuck with
the low limits of that vehicle ¿nd

Pa,en32

cerns ovet the cost
of claims, but concerns such as this do
not justifii disparate

The consumer who insures more
than one automobile, of course,
gets shortchan ged.

resident corporations . Døtsís, 282
Mont. at 243-45,937 P.2d at 32-34.

llenry

The undetþing justìfication for
such an enactment
may reside in insur-

Døais, upra.InDøuis,
this court sffuck down
Section 25 -2-1,22Q) MCA,
which purported to restrict venue
options availal>Ie to victims of non-

Seealso

Asin Døaís, examples make the
point Assume that A and B each
purchase $300,000 of combined
UM/UIM coverage. Each then suf-

Jupra

demonstrate a compelling
state interest that justifies
discriminatory impacts of
the type mandated by
Section 33-23-203.Indeed, the stâtute cânnot
even pâss muster undet

selves.

that,"coveraqe from one policy. . .
may [not] be added to the covetage
of anothet " lessens the discdminatory impact of Section 33-23-203 ln
any w^y. See Section 33-23-203(3)
MCA. Stated bluntly, the reasoning
that undedies the 1997 amendments
to Section 33-23-203 is inexplicable
in logic, law, or fairness.

treâtment. This court
recognizes that dis-

crimination always
diffetence is that the car in which A is

results in lower costs
and has repeatedly disallowed dis-

riding carries $25,000 UIM limits,
while the car catryingB is uninsured.

crimination merely for the sake of

Pursuant to the legislatrve mandate
of Section 33-23-203(1)(a) and þ),
Montana's courts are ditected to determine that A is precluded from
obtaining the $300,000 benefit of the
coverâge purchased, while B is not.
Moreoveq pursuant to Section
33-23-203(1)(c), this court is ordered
by the legislature to disregard the
insured's fund¿mental rights discussed above and discriminate in

Mont. at 459,982P.2d at 464;

favor of those who purchase UM/
UIM coverage for one vehicle. The
statute declares that this savrry consumer gets the full benefit of the
bargain. One premium is paid, one
coverage is obtained. The consumer
who insures more than one âutomobile, of course, gets shortchanged.
Multiple premiums are paid, but still,
just one coverage is obtarned.
Discrimination such as this is

indistinguishable ftom the "one work

shift" versus "two work shifts" distinction declared ttrational tn II enry
and the limited venue restrictions
sttuck down in Døuís. And, regardof legislative notions to the conft^ty, no amount of written notice

less

"flscal health."

Ilenry,

saþra,294

Ileíslera. Ilìnes Motor

Co. (1.997),
282Mont. 270,283,937 P.zd 45, 52.

Flere, as tn

lleisler

and

lfenry,there

is no ration¿l reason - let alone the
required compelling state interest - to
explain why similatly situated people
should be treated differently so âs to
deprive one, but not the other, of
either their insurance premiums or
the benefits of theit personal insurance coverage purchased, paid fot
and accepted by the insurer.

4. The legislature's

abridgement
of these inalienable rights vio-

lates substantive due process.

"No petson shall be denied of
hfe, liberry, or property without due
process of law." Montana Constìtution,
Aîticle II, Sution /7 (/972). This guarantee of due process not only imposes standards of fairness in
governmental procedures, but also
contains a substantive component.
Neuaílle a. Sta.te Dept of Fømùþ
Seruûces (1,994), 267 Mont. 237, 249,
883 P.2d 793, 800. Substantive due

TRrAr TnrNos
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process prevents the state from using
its power to take unreasonable, atbittaty, or capricious action. To satisfy
substantive due ptocess concerns, "a
statute enacted by the legislature must
be reasonably telated to a permissible
legislative objective." Plumb o.

F ourt b ju dící øl Di s trìct (199 6), 27 9

Mont. 363,372,927 P.2d 1.011, 1.01.6,
cittng Neoaaíllc,883P.2d at 803.
At a minimum, it is diffìcult to
isolate the "petmissible legislative
objective" that undedies legislation
authorizing the insurance industty to
sell illusory coverage. If lowet insurance cost for consumers is the goal,
then how can one atgue that legislation that authotizes insutets to charge
multiple premiums for a single coverage be seen as "reasonably related" to
that end? If, instead, we assume that
increased insutance industry profit is
the goal, then the question becomes,
is this a proper legislative objective in
the first instance ot is it instead a

legislative gtant of special privìlege?
Even assumìng one finds a way
to conclude that increased profit for
insuters is a petmissible objective, is
delegation of the power to sell illusory insurance coverage reasonable ot
arbirrary? To ask these questions is to
ânswer them. Suffice it to sa¡ it is
not easy to raltonahze a legislatìve
strategy that authorizes insutets to
chatge for covetage they do not in-

tend to provide, particulatly when
one commences the inquiry with the

undetstanding that insurance contracts have long been identified as
contracts of adhesion. Transanrcrìcø
Insurarrce C-omþøqt u. Rayle
(1,983),202 Mont. 173,'181., 656 P.zd
820,825 and Fitzgerøld. u. Aetnø
fnsurøtrce Comp øny (197 8), 17 6
Mont. 1.86,'1.9'l.., 577 P.2d 370,373.
Since it goes without saying that
to chatge ptemium under a contrâct
of adhesion with no intention of
providing coverage is unconscio-

nable, one is left v¡ith the statk tealiza:j.on that the legislative branch has
granted the insurance industry catte
blanc to sell a product that,'tn any
other citcumstarìce, would be void
and wholly unenforceable. Legislative
actions mote atbitraty, inexplicable,
and unreasonable than this ate rarely
seen. t

1. Neither pubÌic policy considerations
nor the validity of Seclion 33-23-203
(1997) were considered in
o.

M outtt øín

We st

Cbristensen

Farnt Bure øu

In sur ønc e Comþ øny, 2000 MT 37 8,
22P.3d 624, or cotld have been. There,
the plaintiff sought to stack liability
coverâges, not personâl and portable

UM/UIM

coverages.

None of the

public policy and constitutional conccrns central to the present inquiry
were implicated

in Cbrìstensen.'lhe

questions certihed by the Honotable
Donald W Molloy present these issues
fo¡ consideration against the backdrop
of Section 33-23-203 (1997), for the

Ftst timc.
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